Posts Tagged ‘torstar’

It’s a challenge, but there’s value to be had in CanWest’s papers

Sunday, January 24th, 2010
VOX / MEDIA
Report on Business: Globe Investor Column
It’s a challenge, but there’s value to be had in CanWest’s papers
FABRICE TAYLOR
697 words
2 December 2009
GLOB
B16
English
2009 CTVglobemedia Publishing Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Fabrice Taylor is a chartered financial analyst.

ftaylor@globeandmail.com

The newspaper booth at the job recruitment fair is easy to find. It’s staffed by a sullen and sclerotic middle-ager and there’s no one around. Occasional passers-by snicker as they head toward the Google and Facebook booths.

These are tough times for newspapers to be sure, but they’re not necessarily dead.

Soon CanWest’s newspapers will change hands, and investors might get to play. I think there’s money to be made under the right circumstances.

The first is that the buyers need to have substantial skin in the game. If they don’t, run. More important: they must bring ideas and brooms. The papers need to be shaken up.

The papers have trusted brands and cash flow. New owners must use that cash to reinvent the business.

It used to be that you could make 30 cents of earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation by publishing a newspaper (these are U.S. numbers, but they were roughly true in Canada). Now, that number looks more like 15 cents. That makes it harder to service debt, let alone pay it down and it’s hobbled the current owners. A sound balance sheet is needed to make real changes.

Operationally, how many things can change? By way of example: A few years ago I sat down with the associate publisher of a CanWest paper. I mentioned Adwords and he drew a blank. Adwords is how Google makes billions of dollars and kills newspapers. He’d never heard of it. This is two years ago, not 10.

CanWest was an unwillingly destructive owner. Having paid too much for Southam, it had no choice. Instead of innovating, it had to slash. Instead of evolving, it had to do more of the same with less. Result: the product got more predictable and boring, morale plummeted, good people left, readers fled and advertisers followed. The response to declining revenues, when you’ve got a debt sword over your head, is not to change, it’s to shrink costs, which accelerated the rate of reader declines. You need to invest by attracting new people and ideas.

To further the point: The classified sections of newspapers are thinning out before your eyes. Ten years ago they were chock-a-block and churned out profits.

Now all those ads are on Craigslist and Kijiji. They’re stimulating demand by charging nothing for the ads unless you upgrade to a premium listing. But they also sell display ads because they have the eyeballs. They might not be able to charge top dollar but they’re not burdened with expensive unionized work forces.

Why didn’t newspapers create sites like these? Some dabbled but by and large they didn’t try. It reminds me of Sony’s blunder: it invented the Walkman for cassettes then the Discman for CDs. But it didn’t invent the iPod (it did but it didn’t market it). Why? It worried that music piracy would eat into its music publishing revenues.

I don’t think it’s too late for newspapers to carve out sensible pieces of the Web, especially if they can attract people with the right ideas.

To be fair CanWest isn’t alone. The revolving door at Torstar and its flagship Toronto Star paints the picture of a desperate board that doesn’t know what it’s doing.

I could go on but you get the idea. There are problems in the industry and particularly at the CanWest papers. But there’s also opportunity. It is possible to make money and grow in this business. The Economist does, and in fact does so not by being home to myriad individual voices like the blogosphere but by having one intelligent and reliable voice.

Most newspapers still have good brand names and cash flow, especially once freed of the debt yoke. Those are valuable assets that, in the right hands (someone from Google perhaps?) can be turned into value.

Document GLOB000020091202e5c200018

It’s the directors that forge a CEO’s golden parachute

Saturday, January 23rd, 2010
VOX / CORPORATE GOVERNANCE / COMPENSATION
Report on Business: Globe Investor Column
It’s the directors that forge a CEO’s golden parachute
FABRICE TAYLOR
808 words
11 May 2009
GLOB
B9
English
2009 CTVglobemedia Publishing Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Fabrice Taylor is a chartered financial analyst.

ftaylor@globeandmail.com

Don’t let anyone tell you corporate governance is enjoying a renaissance. If it were, outgoing CEOs wouldn’t be decamping the corner suite under a cloud with briefcases stuffed with money.

But while it’s the departing company head who gets the blame, it should be aimed at the directors who agreed to his pay, and in some cases who hired him in the first place.

Robert Prichard was crowned Torstar’s TS.B-T CEO in 2002. Seven years later, not to mention an 80-per-cent drop in the stock from its peak, he rode off into the sunset with a severance package worth almost $10-million.

How did that happen? It turns out the board of directors last year renegotiated his contract so that he’d get the same terms if he left voluntarily as if he got sacked (without cause). Mr. Prichard must have haggled that one hard. Imagine that: he gets to save face by leaving “voluntarily” and he gets the gold plated good-riddance gift. If I’m reading the management circular properly, he’ll even get a pro-rated bonus for this year (quote: “In addition, Mr. Prichard will be paid his annual bonus for the year in which he resigns on a pro-rated basis when the bonuses are paid to other senior executives”). If so, that’s another million or so – breath-taking given the value destruction Torstar investors have suffered. The recession is one thing, but what has Torstar done in the past seven years to deal with the Internet threat?

“The CEO has a contractual right to receive severance, and the board honours that contract,” Torstar chairman Frank Iacobucci told peeved shareholders at the annual meeting. “The board unanimously determined that the arrangement was in the best interest of the company.”

Hard to see how shareholders benefit, unless he’s referring to getting rid of Mr. Prichard.

The former CEO, it should be noted, forfeited past stock options (not the ones he’ll earn this year though), but they were massively underwater and unlikely to surface ever again. And he’s bound by a non-compete. If I were a Torstar owner I’d want him to compete with my company.

But to repeat, don’t blame Mr. Prichard. We’d all take the money and run if the only inconvenience was the brief glare of a harsh spotlight. He was the wrong guy for the job – which is the board’s fault – and he was overpaid, also the board’s doing.

The situation at Manulife MFC-T is different. Dominic D’Alessandro was an experienced CEO who made bold moves that created value. But he made one fatal error – selling stock investments that guaranteed an investor’s principal. Manulife had been protecting itself from a downturn in markets but then stopped to improve earnings.

That crushed the company’s stock when markets tumbled, and Mr. D’Alessandro’s personal wealth. At the end of 2007 his Manulife shares and options were worth more than $100-million.

The board apparently took pity on the CEO and tried to give him $12.5-million (U.S.) for a few months work before he retired. Shareholders, needless to say, were not impressed. The move especially rankled because Mr. D’Alessandro was a voice of reason on governance over the years.

He modified the deal to make it more palatable. It still annoys some shareholders. Yes, he did a lot of good. But the earnings he generated were overstated because they didn’t factor in a drastic drop in stock prices. Neither did the board, which either didn’t know of the company’s decision to stop hedging or agreed.

Warren Buffett, who knows a thing or two about insurance, called the products Manulife sold “poison” from the perspective of the insurer. Those who sold them, he said, were “crazy.”

The common denominator is: What are directors thinking? Or are they? If anything, when you consider these failures, it should serve as a reminder that investing is as much about people as it is numbers – maybe more so. People make the decisions behind the numbers – behind the red ink in the case of both Torstar and Manulife. And it’s not just the CEO.

Some will ask why stop at directors? Blame investors, who elect them, or can if they rouse themselves to vote their shares. But I don’t think you need a mandate from investors to understand that Torstar needs a leader who understands new media, or that guaranteeing anything in the volatile stock market is risky. You just need common sense.

Illustration

Document GLOB000020090511e55b0001d