Posts Tagged ‘Barrick’

Investing is easy – if you lie to yourself

Sunday, January 24th, 2010
VOX / PORTFOLIO BUILDING
Report on Business: Globe Investor Column
Investing is easy – if you lie to yourself
FABRICE TAYLOR
688 words
9 December 2009
GLOB
B13
English
2009 CTVglobemedia Publishing Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Fabrice Taylor is a chartered financial analyst.

ftaylor@globeandmail.com

It’s Christmas party season, which means lots of standing around in kitchens surrounded by people looking for stock tips. Over the years I’ve noticed something curious about us retail investors: We’re all brilliant. None of us ever loses money; we all make healthy returns over time.

It’s not true, or course. Most retail investors lose money, and if not, they don’t keep up with the index. Investing is hard. One of the hardest parts is not falling for the sad tricks you can play on yourself in your mental accounting.

You know what I mean: That tendency to tell yourself that you’d be doing great if you had just ignored that one bomb. “I’d be up 14 per cent if I hadn’t bought General Electric for $40 and sold it for $6.”

If a company tried to tell investors it was profitable except for that huge loss, there’d be a lawsuit, yet we all do it to ourselves, let’s be honest. And here’s how the math works out: If you make 12 per cent one year, then 14, then 17, you’re up 50 per cent after three years, which is excellent. But if you get drunk on success and forget that stocks also go down and lose 40 per cent, you’re suddenly down. You’ve lost every cent you made and a 10th of your principal.

Here’s where it really hurts: You have to make 21 points in the next year just to get back to zero in real terms, i.e. to be flat including inflation (I used 2 per cent for the rate incidentally). Sadly, your simple average return is less than 1 per cent. Good luck with that.

So it’s easy to see why our minds try to protect us from this misery. It’s also easy to see why avoiding losses is quite literally more important than making money in the stock market. Losses are very difficult to recover from, yet they don’t seem insurmountable unless you really think about it in the cold sober light of day.

As to how to avoid losses, that’s pretty straightforward, and it’s not just about sticking to quality. Some of the biggest blowups in the market in the past year were blue chips, such as General Electric.

The answer is stick to what you know and understand. Barrick Gold’s annual report is 154 pages, much of it inscrutable. Wesdome Gold Mines, a Vox favourite and up 145 per cent since we recommended it 10 months ago, gives you 34 pages of reading (disclosure: I own the debentures). Leon’s Furniture’s annual report is also 34 pages. Bank of Montreal‘s is 158 pages. It’s not just size of course, it’s how understandable it is. But generally, there’s a correlation between size and ease of use.

As for the fact that there aren’t too many easy-to-understand companies worth investing in, that’s the grim reality of the stock market. If they were all great companies, they wouldn’t need money from other investors would they?

This is useful to think about if you’re shopping for someone to manage your money. The truth is that there aren’t that many really good professional money managers in this country.

Even some of the publicity-shy investors with great long-term records have recently had fatal blowups.

But there are a few – they tend to get next to no publicity because they don’t want it – and I can assure you that the most striking thing about their returns is not that they’re eye-popping. It’s that they’re consistent. Eye-popping returns tend to be associated with blowups.

They avoid blowing up and they don’t think they’re brilliant because they’re on a run. They know better than that.

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A hedge too far

Sunday, January 24th, 2010
VOX / PRECIOUS METALS
Report on Business: Globe Investor Column
A hedge too far
FABRICE TAYLOR
828 words
11 September 2009
GLOB
B9
English
2009 CTVglobemedia Publishing Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Fabrice Taylor is a chartered financial analyst. ftaylor@globeandmail.com

It must be nice to be Barrick Gold. Think of all those little companies out there with great ideas that can’t get a cent from investors. Yet Barrick, to its everlasting credit, can pick up the phone and raise $3.5-billion (U.S.) in a matter of days, and not because it has a great idea. On the contrary: The money will go to paper over a mistake.

A few years ago I wrote some skeptical things about Barrick’s hedge book and heard from a few professional money managers who insisted there was nothing wrong with it, that it had allowed the company to earn lots of money despite low gold prices.

Oh yeah? Barrick, as of June 30, had retained earnings of about $3-billion – meaning that’s roughly the cumulative profit it has generated over time. Now that the company has decided to wind down some of its hedges, it will be taking a huge charge in the coming quarters that will wipe out those earnings and then some. Did it really make lots of money from the hedge program? Nope.

I draw two lessons from this: One, professional managers are sometimes as dumb as the rest of us; and two, what kind of stupid accounting rules allow a company to keep its mark-to-market losses off the balance sheet and income statement? Until, that is, it effectively concedes defeat.

Fans of hedging will say the stock has held up well. It has for sure, although you haven’t made much money owning Barrick long term, despite the fact that it enjoys an enormous market capitalization relative to its profitability. Bloomberg has the price-earnings ratio at 25 times, and that’s before the financing and hedge-trimming were announced. It’s bound to be higher now. The few analysts who have commented on the financing (most are conflicted because it takes a lot of banks to sell that much paper – even Barrick’s) point to a big dilution on earnings but are otherwise enthusiastic.

Lots of people would, and will, buy Barrick shares – the stock was up 3.3 per cent yesterday. The overallotment of 14 million shares will probably go too, bringing the total raised to about $4-billion. I wouldn’t buy it, for the simple reason that I don’t understand how the company works. Yes, the fixed-price hedges will, in theory, be gone within a year. These are hedges that deprive Barrick of upside (and protect it from downside) on gold prices.

There are three million ounces hedged this way. Barrick will either give the counterparties gold from its mines or buy gold in the open market to end them. That will cost, at current prices, about $2-billion.

Barrick will also eliminate some of its floating-rate hedges, which represent a liability of $3.7-billion. These, we’re told, allow the company to participate in the price of gold. Yet, somehow, when gold goes up, the liability does too. I’m sure there’s an explanation but if you want gold, buy gold, not complicated trades. And which ones will it unwind? Not all, that much we know, but are some more complex than others?

I also think Barrick wears a halo that’s not entirely deserved. Witness how some investors and analysts reckon that gold prices are likely to rise since Barrick is unwinding its hedges. If the world’s pre-eminent gold company knew where gold was going, it wouldn’t have unwound its trades at $1,000 an ounce, it would have done it at $300, or $400, or even $800, saving investors big bucks.

And while the hedge book gets all the attention, keep in mind that Barrick also sold a bunch of its future silver production for $625-million. If it’s bullish on gold, why not on silver? And if it’s bullish on silver, why sell it? Unless you have to.

The company insists in its prospectus that lenders and counterparties had no say in its decision to unwind. Company officials can’t talk right now, but I’d say there’s a healthy possibility that counterparties did have some influence. (By the way, the prospectus also says the underwriting syndicate may engage in stabilizing trades to keep the price of the stock from falling too much during the financing. Yesterday’s rally might not be what it seems.) In stock parlance, what I call a halo is a multiple. And Barrick’s is rich for what you get.

Barrick Gold

In U.S. dollars                  6 mo. 2009 6 mo. 2008
Share profit                     $0.98      $1.13
Cash from operations (mil.)      $1,067     $1,223
Cash invested in business (mil.) $1,039     $2,378
Net cash flow (mil.)             $28        -$1,155

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Franco-Nevada knows how to price potential

Saturday, January 23rd, 2010
VOX / ROYALTIES
Report on Business: Globe Investor Column
Franco-Nevada knows how to price potential
FABRICE TAYLOR
772 words
19 June 2009
GLOB
B9
English
2009 CTVglobemedia Publishing Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Fabrice Taylor is a chartered financial analyst

ftaylor@globeandmail.com

You know you’re doing something right when you can sell fresh shares for more than investors can buy your stock in the marketplace.

Franco-Nevada Corp. FNV-T just closed a financing that raised more than $300-million. The company didn’t seem to need cash – it had $200-million of working capital and no debt before the financing – but when you can raise money you should, and that’s especially true of commodity-related companies. It never hurts to have a war chest of “cheap” money.

So raise money Franco did, in what I think is spectacular fashion. When the deal was announced on May 27, Franco’s shares were changing hands at $30.51.

The deal, a bought one, offered units at $32.50. True, said units came with a half warrant to buy another share (i.e. for every 100 shares you got 50 warrants to buy shares).

But the strike price of the warrant – the price at which investors can buy it – is $75, for a period of eight years. You have to be bullish: Franco’s stock will have to compound at around 15 per cent to give the warrants value.

So it looks like Franco got money on good terms. It looks like the royalty collector is valued on excellent terms, too. According, for example, to National Bank Financial, the company’s net asset value is $13.70 a share. The stock is quoted at twice that. How is it possible that you have to pay twice what the company’s stock is worth to get your hands on some?

Management and reputation are probably part of the equation. Franco’s a name; it made a lot of money before being swallowed up in the Newmont empire, from which it was carved out and refloated on the public markets. The business model probably has special appeal today too: Franco is, as mentioned, a royalty company.

It earns money mainly right off the top line, that is before everyone else, from a portfolio of senior energy and precious metals producers. In other words, it’s not exposed to the operational risk that can bedevil these companies. By the same token, it can earn less too because it doesn’t get the kick from the leverage a well-run company can engineer.

But is that enough to explain why this company is so richly valued? Probably not. Investors might pay for the growth potential embedded in royalties. The Franco story is legendary in that regard. One of its earliest royalty investments cost about $2-million and covered about 3,400 acres of ground in the middle of a gold trend in Nevada. The property was a small producer but the land was cheap and Franco management’s theory was that a deposit to the south owned by Newmont would extend northward. That ended up being wrong.

But in any case, Barrick Gold bought the land covered by the royalties for $62-million then cranked up production, which rose from 44,000 ounces to 75,000 at once. Within three months, Barrick “hit a hole,” as they say – made a major discovery of ore that would become Goldstike, the biggest new discovery outside South Africa.

Production, over which Franco earned a roughly 13-per-cent interest, grew to more than two million ounces annually, and Franco never had to put up a dime of the huge amount it took to build the mines. (This account is from Get Smarter, by Franco founder Seymour Schulich – well worth reading.) To date, Franco’s investment in that royalty has produced about a billion bucks – breathtaking.

Of course, such finds are exceptionally rare. There’s a lot of luck involved. So how much is “potential” worth?

That’s a tough one to answer, but I would make a simplistic argument that potential is reflected in the warrants, which are changing hands for $4.30. Investors, in other words, are willing to pay that much to bet that Franco’s share price will be north of the strike price – call it north of $80, because you have to add in the value of the warrant.

Hard to say if that’s a fair price or not, but it’s a lot easier to say that Franco has a conservative culture; it avoids debt and sells equity when it deems it dear. This is a stock worth owning, particularly if you can get it for less.

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The shine on gold is fading

Saturday, January 23rd, 2010
VOX: MINING
Report on Business: Globe Investor Column
The shine on gold is fading
FABRICE TAYLOR
846 words
17 April 2009
GLOB
B10
English
2009 CTVglobemedia Publishing Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Fabrice Taylor is a chartered financial analyst.

ftaylor@globeandmail.com

Fans of Dennis Gartman who didn’t read his latest missive should know that as of two days ago he is bearish on gold. That’s subject to change on a daily – if not hourly basis – but as of the latest report, that’s the trade.

Mr. Gartman, in the unlikely event that you haven’t tripped over him, is the well-known trader and ubiquitous author of The Gartman Letter. Assuming his gold trade is right, we might be at the top of the gold market. If that’s true, though, gold mining is a sunset industry. If $900 (U.S.) is the top, gold mines are an endangered species.

Take Barrick Gold Corp. ABX as an example – as a proxy for the industry in fact. It’s the biggest and most prestigious of the world’s gold miners, with a market capitalization of $26-billion. Seventeen analysts rate Barrick a buy, two a sell. (Mr. Gartman says this is a great reason to be short because the buyers have already bought. When everyone is long gold, in other words, short gold – or producers.) Barrick has been around for about 25 years. Over that quarter century it’s amassed a mere $2.3-billion in retained earnings. That’s more than just about any other company, but to call Barrick rich is a stretch. That’s true even at $900 gold.

A few short years ago it cost the firm less than $200 to dig an ounce of gold out of the ground. BMO Nesbitt Burns pegs the cost at $450 to $475 this year. It’s still making more money but the margins aren’t much better, if they’re better all.

And mining gold isn’t getting easier. No less an authority than Barrick chairman Peter Munk says it’s possible that all the easy gold deposits have been found. Now they look for gold on top of Andean mountains. They find it there too, but the grades are meagre. And as Mr. Munk puts it, if you think it’s hard to ski at that altitude, try swinging a pick axe. Or words to that effect. (And try moving parts of a glacier while you’re at it.) The capital cost of these projects runs into the billions. Production that Barrick paid a lot less for years ago – the easy deposits in politically and geographically safe places like Nevada – are depleting and supposed to be replaced by these exorbitant mountain-top properties.

Mr. Gartman would not approve of that trade, but what’s the company to do? And despite adding to reserves this way, production isn’t going up much, if at all, again according to BMO’s research. It gets worse for Barrick, and other miners.

The company hedged a lot of its gold at prices well below today’s market and, in some cases, below production costs. It’s very hard to make money when you promise to sell for less than your costs. The hedge book has burned a multibillion-dollar hole in the balance sheet (even though it’s off-balance sheet). It must make the company’s bankers giddy with anticipation. On top of that there’s $5-billion of debt on the books.

So where will the company – the industry – find the cash to build these remote mines? Not from cash flow: There’s not enough of that after shelling out to keep the lights on. Not from debt, judging from the recent financings. No, it will come from selling more shares.

Ten years ago, Barrick had 377 million shares outstanding. It’s hosed out half a billion more since then, a lot of that for acquisitions. Again, this is typical of the industry. Over the past decade, the return on the stock is low single digits – which is better than a lot of gold names. Gold may be insurance, and insurance only pays off when there is an accident, but you might be better off self-insuring instead of buying these policies.

At the top of the market for other commodities, companies don’t issue shares. Their equity is expensive and they’re on top of the world. They issue debt instead (which is why the plunge in prices has killed or is killing so many companies.)

If this is really the top of the market, you can see why the industry is finished. Taking into account the all-in cost of finding and producing gold, miners and their investors can’t afford prices that are much lower than where they are now.

If this is the beginning of an irreversible decline in mining, it stands to reason that the price of gold is inevitably headed higher over time. Demand won’t go away even if supply does.

There will be higher prices for gold, but we’ll just have to wait until the next cycle comes round.

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