Archive for the ‘Money Managers’ Category

Gartman fund needs less talk, more action

Sunday, January 24th, 2010
VOX / INVESTING
Report on Business: Globe Investor Column
Gartman fund needs less talk, more action
FABRICE TAYLOR
822 words
30 November 2009
GLOB
B8
English
2009 CTVglobemedia Publishing Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Fabrice Taylor is a chartered financial analyst

Dennis Gartman never shies away from declaring a bubble when he sees one, or thinks he does.

Today the bubble is in gold. Mind you, the bubble was in gold several months ago, too. If it was a bubble at $700 (U.S.), I suppose, it’s an even bigger bubble today. But that doesn’t prevent Mr. Gartman from owning gold. The man works in mysterious ways.

Vox rarely declares a bubble, but we make an exception today: The bubble is in Dennis Gartman. When you start calling Warren Buffett an “idiot” while you lose money for your own investors, you’re way too big for your britches.

Mr. Gartman is, of course, author of the eponymous newsletter on all things investable.

The author is very opinionated and speaks with great conviction, which is a rare and attractive quality. Most money managers are guarded, circumspect bores on the record. Mr. Gartman is fun to read and listen to. That’s probably why he gets so much media attention and, in turn, is able to raise money.

Mr. Gartman is also famous for his trading rules, of which there are 17, ranging from the sensible (“mental capital trumps real capital”) to the ambiguous (“trade like a mercenary soldier”). By and large, though, his philosophy can be summed up as “Go with Big Mo” – meaning be a momentum trader (or as he puts it, “We’re not a business of buying low and selling high; we’re a business of buying high and selling higher”).

Whether you’re just vaguely acquainted with his work or an avid reader, you must have asked yourself at one point if Mr. Gartman actually makes any money for himself or for his readers by trading. Until recently, there’s never been a reliable way to gauge. Now there is, and it’s not particularly impressive.

Launched last March, the Horizons AlphaPro Gartman ETF is managed by the man himself using the wisdom he dispenses in his newsletter.

The fund launch was well-timed, coming as it did just as stocks were about to start one of the greatest runs of all time. Mr. Gartman’s investors, though, are down. The units, sold to investors for $10 a few months ago, closed at $9.12 on Friday, giving the ETF a market cap of about $52.5-million.

Now, we have to be fair: For starters, about 50 cents of the purchase price was eaten up in underwriting fees. We can’t blame Mr. Gartman for that.

And the net asset value of the fund is, as of the most recent calculation, $9.35. So while investors are down about 9 per cent, Mr. Gartman’s picks have only cost them 3 per cent.

But the market is up 30 per cent since the fund launched. What’s up with that? Mr. Gartman didn’t get back to me, but the people at Horizons AlphaPro tell me the fund is intended to be market neutral, meaning it won’t move with the market. Why? Because it’s long and short, and supposedly constructed in such a way that the market’s performance has no net effect on the returns. The only thing that does have an effect, in theory, is the manager’s skill. It may be early days, but Mr. Gartman’s performance has been found wanting.

He’s expected to return between 6 and 12 per cent regardless of the market. Eight months in, he’s nowhere near that. And by the way, I don’t see any mention of market neutral in the prospectus, and I don’t recall Mr. Gartman being a market-neutral enthusiast, although he hedges many of his trades.

What’s troubling about Mr. Gartman as a money manager is that while he gives good quotes and speaks with conviction, he doesn’t invest with quite the same resolve. If gold is a bubble, why buy gold? And if it’s because gold is going up, even if you don’t think it should, why am I paying you for your management skill? I don’t need help buying whatever is going up.

Maybe the most telling anecdote is this: In the early days of launching his fund, Mr. Gartman had the brilliant idea to short Berkshire Hathaway, and short it hard: almost 10 per cent of the fund’s value. By the end of October, he had closed off that trade (Mr. Gartman’s rule No. 1: Never, ever, ever, under any circumstance, add to a losing position … ever!).

Berkshire, run by that “idiot” Warren Buffett, is up 17 per cent since the Gartman fund launched.

Perhaps Mr. Gartman should add another rule: People who live in glass houses shouldn’t throw stones. Never, ever, ever.

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For Quebeckers, it pays to play at home

Sunday, January 24th, 2010
VOX / PORTFOLIO / TAX STRATEGY
Report on Business: Globe Investor Column
For Quebeckers, it pays to play at home
FABRICE TAYLOR
865 words
2 November 2009
GLOB
B8
English
2009 CTVglobemedia Publishing Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Fabrice Taylor is a chartered financial analyst.

ftaylor@globeandmail.com

If you could make a potentially risky investment with up to two-thirds of your capital effectively insured by the government, would you?

Given that “potentially risky” implies potentially rewarding, the answer is probably yes because that insurance policy cuts your risk while leaving your potential upside intact. That’s the essence of flow-through investing.

A column a couple of weeks ago on the subject yielded an e-mail from a Montreal broker who spelled out a little-known detail about flow-through investments in Quebec. It makes you want to move there.

If you’re like me, your eyes start to glaze over when you think about taxes, but getting a better deal from your silent partner in Ottawa – i.e., the taxman – is the easiest way to increase your wealth. It’s worth the effort, so stay with me.

Quebeckers are often deprived of the things we take for granted, such as those contests that aren’t open to residents of la belle province. They’re also deprived of a lot of investment opportunities because the cost of doing business there – such as translating financial literature into French and the language barrier in general – is prohibitive, especially for smaller offerings.

Yet smaller funds are often the best ones, and Quebec, whose tax system is semi-autonomous, gives its residents rich tax breaks on flow-through offerings – but only certain ones (more on that later).

In the rest of Canada flow-through investments are 100-per-cent tax deductible: For every buck you invest, your taxable income drops by a buck. In Quebec, however, for every buck you invest your taxable income drops by as much $1.44. On top of this, there are capital-gains benefits to flow-through investments in Quebec.

These numbers come from the literature for the Jov Diversified Quebec flow-through fund, which our Montreal broker pointed me to, asking why the benefits are so much better in this province. The answer is typical of Quebec. The province, not surprisingly, gives better tax breaks if the money is invested at home.

If you live in British Columbia and buy flow-through investments, it doesn’t matter if all the money is invested in Alberta; you’ll get your tax break. Not so in Quebec. Money invested elsewhere gets less of a deduction – substantially so. But money invested domestically can yield the prodigious benefits mentioned above.

There are lots of resource plays in Quebec, of course, but if I lived there and wanted flow-through shares, I probably wouldn’t want a fund that invested only locally. For starters, you’re practically shut out of the oil-and-gas sector if you’re only in Quebec. (It has some marginal gas resource, but that’s about it.)

But even if you run the numbers at 75 per cent – the Jov flow-through fund says that’s minimum it will invest in Quebec but judging from the attention energy gets in the literature, I wouldn’t be surprised if it were the maximum – the tax breaks are still outstanding in relative terms, as the accompanying table shows.

The Jov fund has one of the hottest managers in the sector right now, but there are other products offered by fund managers Mavrix Fund Management and Pathway Asset Management. Be careful about one thing: Some funds offered in Quebec are national, meaning they don’t benefit from the uniquely nationalistic tax largesse the province offers.

There’s a second point worth making about these investments in general. A good barometer of future success in a particular investment is how well it’s selling. When no one wants to buy stocks, buy them. When no one wants to buy natural gas, buy gas.

When no one wants to buy flow-through investments, buy flow-through investments. This year is not shaping up to be a great year, with $340-million raised so far and it looks like it might finish at $400-million. The number was $2-billion in 2007.

Clearly, you didn’t want to be a buyer in 2007, when $2-billion became roughly $300-million – because there was too much money chasing a limited and finite amount of success.

Using this yardstick, this year looks like it’ll be a lot better, especially for our Québécois brothers and sisters.

***

Vive la différence

Quebeckers have more fun when it comes to tax breaks for resource companies

                                             Outside Quebec Quebec
                                             Quebec  100%   75%**
Assumed marginal tax rate                    45%     48.2%  48.2%
Investment amount                            $5,000  $5,000 $5,000

Net flow-through share and other tax savings $2,408  $3,450 $3,189.50
Capital gains tax*                           -$1,125 -$606  -$735.75
Total tax deductions                         $1,283  $2,844 $2,453.75

At-risk capital                              $2,641  $1,600 $1,860.25

Break-even proceeds                          $3,345  $1,821 $2,202

Downside protection                          33%     64%    56%
*Assumes the investment is sold for $5,000.
**Estimate.
Source: The Globe and Mail

Behind Heathbridge’s great trades? Guts

Sunday, January 24th, 2010
VOX / INVESTMENT ADVISERS
Report on Business: Globe Investor Column
Behind Heathbridge’s great trades? Guts
FABRICE TAYLOR
937 words
29 October 2009
GLOB
B13
English
2009 CTVglobemedia Publishing Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Fabrice Taylor is a chartered financial analyst.

ftaylor@globeandmail.com

The challenge was to find portfolio managers who brought distinction upon themselves and added to their clients’ wealth during the financial crisis. Enter Heathbridge Capital Management.

Money managers don’t have many opportunities to distinguish themselves. The past year is one of those rare periods that can separate talent from mediocrity. (I say “can” because you can never take chance completely out of the equation.)

The stock market was flat in the year ended Sept. 30. Heathbridge’s clients are up 14 per cent over the same period. The median equity mutual fund return, meanwhile, is down a bit more than the market. Over 10 years, Heathbridge is up 7.4 per cent versus 5.7 per cent for mutual funds. (Heathbridge doesn’t run funds; it manages individual accounts.)

So, we want to know the firm’s secret. Vice-president Richard Tattersall shared a few of the firm’s winning trades and the thinking behind them. The most interesting one involved Thomson Reuters, the company born of the marriage between the Canadian and British information companies.

After the merger, shares of the company continued trading on the London, New York and Toronto stock exchanges. But the London-listed shares, while having the same economic interest in the company, were not exchangeable into normal stock. These shares traded at a steep discount of 20 per cent to the North American ones. In a world where arbitrage is possible, that shouldn’t happen.

Mr. Tattersall explains that the discount was the result of two forces. First, arbitrage desks at dealers were stripped of their capital because of the financial crisis and therefore couldn’t short sell the stock in North America while buying in Britain, which would normally close the gap. (A short sale occurs when the seller borrows stock from a brokerage, and sells it, expecting the price to fall. If it does, the seller will buy stock at the lower price to replace the stock that was borrowed.)

The second reason was that European analysts were bearish on the stock because Reuters had been a dog. Heathbridge, which owned Thomson in its portfolios, sold the stock in North America and bought the London variety.

Mr. Tattersall and his partners figured that eventually, that gap would close. They were right; Thomson exchanged the stock for regular shares. The stock went up 40 per cent. Plus, it paid a 5-per-cent dividend. It’s nice to make 65 points on a top-drawer blue chip.

Heathbridge also played the financial sector well, selling most of its bank stocks in mid-2006 – “a little early” Mr. Tattersall acknowledges. The crew didn’t like the risks the banks were taking with their balance sheets, even Toronto-Dominion Bank, their favourite (Heathbridge only buys one stock per sector). They sold the rest of their TD shares last fall at $68. They bought the stock back in the subsequent equity offering at $39.

With respect to U.S. financial services companies, Heathbridge’s bet was Wells Fargo . They picked up the stock last fall in the $20s (U.S.), then watched it drop to $8 in March as the markets plummeted and fears of nationalization mounted. Yet Mr. Tattersall and his partners, Robert Richards and Rupel Ruparelia, reasoned that the bank’s fee-based earnings, from its commercial real estate, insurance brokerages and mutual fund business, were not properly understood. The bank had ventured into these businesses through acquisitions, resulting in a lot of goodwill on the balance sheet. Government stress tests, meanwhile, didn’t consider goodwill a real asset, even though in this case it was. The bank also enjoyed huge retail interest rate spreads – a big driver of earnings.

What did they do? Bought more. The stock today? $28.

“If shoes or milk are on sale, you buy more. When stocks are on sale, people panic,” Mr. Tattersall says.

That phenomenon was also evident in gold shares, which last fall fell between 50 and 90 per cent, although gold was down only 20 per cent. That didn’t make sense, so the team bought Barrick Gold enthusiastically at $25 (Canadian). It’s $40 today.

Ask Mr. Tattersall to sum up the firm’s philosophy and he loosely quotes legendary investor Warren Buffett: “Extraordinary investors don’t require extraordinary intelligence, they require extraordinary discipline.”

I’d add to this that they require extraordinary due diligence and intestinal fortitude.

There’s another quality that makes companies like Heathbridge more attractive than mutual funds. Heathbridge is an investment counsel; it doesn’t pool funds, it manages separate accounts, although they have largely similar portfolios.

This is more tax efficient. When you buy into a mutual fund, you can end up paying taxes on gains you didn’t benefit from. For example, if a fund sells a big winner the day after you buy in, you’ll get a tax bill (if it’s outside your RRSP) even though you didn’t benefit.

The bigger problem is the flow of money. Successful funds tend to attract a lot of new cash. Often, the manager wants to maintain his portfolio weightings, meaning as his fund grows, he may end up using that money to buy more of stocks that have gone up a lot. That’s often a recipe for disaster.

The only downside to investment counsel firms like Heathbridge? You need a few hundred thousand to become a client. Makes you want to work hard.

Do’s and don’ts of investing in flow-throughs

Sunday, January 24th, 2010
VOX / PORTFOLIOS / TAX STRATEGY
Report on Business: Globe Investor Column
Do’s and don’ts of investing in flow-throughs
FABRICE TAYLOR
816 words
14 October 2009
GLOB
B16
English
2009 CTVglobemedia Publishing Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Fabrice Taylor is a chartered financial analyst. ftaylor@globeandmail.com

If it’s fall, it must be flow-through season as investors start thinking about cutting their tax bills and cashing in on hot commodity prices.

Flow-through is a great idea from a company’s perspective. It can sell shares at a premium to the market and investors buying said shares are already guaranteed a partial return of principal courtesy of the Canadian government’s generous tax credits.

Flow-through can also be a great idea for investors. But like all great ideas that involve selling to the masses, it’s a very crowded field, which works against investor interests.

Here are some ideas to help you shop around.

The big problem with this kind of investment is that Canada has been pretty well picked over in terms of resources. There are not many quality discoveries waiting to be found. So, by definition, there is a finite amount of money that can be made looking for potential new discoveries.

Unfortunately, flow-through sellers are, like the rest of us, trying to maximize business. They don’t stop raising money even if it exceeds what can profitably be invested.

Investors can protect themselves to a point, which brings me to my first guideline: Size matters, and big is bad, especially at this time of year. Why?

I asked Jim Huang to explain. He’s the president and portfolio manager at TIP Wealth Manager, and runs flow-through funds for Jov Diversified Flow Through.

Managers raising money now have to deploy it by Dec. 31 if it’s for exploration. If the fund is too big, the manager might be forced to make investments he wouldn’t otherwise make, given the time constraints and the scarcity of good deals. Mr. Huang’s current offering under the Jov banner is earmarked for $25-million (although it may not raise that much), and he thinks that’s about right. Too small is not efficient for the manager; too big, say $30-million and up, is awkward and potentially harmful to returns.

Mr. Huang advises that if you’re buying flow-through funds earlier in the year – which is probably a better idea – they can be a little bigger because the manager has more time to deploy the funds.

A second guideline: Look for a fund that diversifies, meaning one that can invest in energy and mining. A diversified mandate allows the manager to avoid, say, oil and gas issues if they’re too expensive. It reduces risks too. Mr. Huang also spreads the money around by geography and by stage of investment. Some companies want money to drill a moose pasture. That’s fine, but the odds of success are extremely small. Others companies are already generating cash flow and are taking on much more probable projects.

A third rule, related to this last point: Ask yourself what you want to achieve. You’re already getting roughly half your principal back thanks to the tax credit. You might see that as an opportunity to swing for the fences because you’re investing “subsidized” dollars. Mr. Huang argues, and I think he’s right, that the thing to do is hit singles and doubles.

He takes a conservative approach aiming first to preserve your capital, and your return. (That said, returns on his 2008 fall fund were outstanding.)

Mr. Huang also practices what he calls active management. Rather than deploying the money and waiting passively to see what comes of the exploratory efforts, he’ll sell shares if he thinks it’s warranted. This served him well in his 2007 fund, when he sold off the more junior shares and put the money in blue-chip energy and resource companies, which didn’t get hammered as badly (he has to stay invested in resources or cash).

Finally, give some thought to liquidity. You want access to your money as fast as possible and you want to be mindful of tax consequences. Rolling the flow-through units into a mutual fund avoids capital gains taxes, but make sure the rollover entity has a decent record.

And always remember that, notwithstanding the tax effects, flow-through is inherently risky. The returns can be very good but “there’s no free lunch,” Mr. Huang says.

*******

Play Ball With Flow-Throughs

Factoring in probabilities, the returns from batting singles might be more attractive than swinging for the fences

                             Home run        Single
Gross investment             $25,000         $25,000
Marginal tax rate            46%             46%
Tax return                   $11,500.00      $11,500.00
Investment return            40%             10%
Total return, incl principal $46,500.00      $39,000.00
Total return*                86%             56%
Odds                         Low probability High probability

*Excludes impact of fees. Source: Globe and Mail

Document GLOB000020091014e5ae0000l